Piracy in Southeast Asia: Real Menace or Red Herring?

By Stefan Eklöf

Counting Piracy

Over the past 25 years piracy and armed robbery against vessels have become a growing concern for the shipping industry and the international community. Since 1984, when the International Maritime Organization of the United Nations started to collect information about acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels, close to 4,000 such acts have been reported to the organization. The problem, moreover, has grown worse since the turn of the millenium. In 2004 alone, 330 cases were recorded – a notable decline from the previous year’s 452 cases, but still a substantially higher figure than any year of the twentieth century. Over half of the attacks worldwide, 169 cases in 2004, occurred in Southeast Asia, and a map of the region included in the IMO’s annual Report on Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships shows much of Indonesia’s coastline dotted with black spots, each representing an attack (1). With most of the attacks in or around Indonesian waters, the country has earned a reputation as a haven for pirates, and a couple of years ago a well-known correspondent and author on organized crime in Asia even dubbed the country the ”pirate republic” (2).

Pirates prowl the high seas of South East Asia in 2005. 

But to what extent do these figures represent the actual situation? On the one hand, the reported attacks are often said to be no more than the tip of an iceberg since many shipping companies for different reasons – including fears of expensive delays in connection with police investigations and harmful publicity – choose not to report attacks against its vessels, neither to the authorities nor to any international organization. Nor do governments generally report incidents to the IMO in spite of a resolution, passed in 1983, requesting member states to report all attacks against vessels flying the flag of their country to the organization (3). The main source of information about pirate attacks is instead the International Maritime Bureau, a unit of the International Chamber of Commerce, which since 1992 operates a Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur. The Centre is mainly financed through voluntary contributions from the shipping and insurance industry. One of its main tasks – in addition to assisting the victims of pirate attacks and assisting the authorities in investigations – is to receive and collate information about piratical activity and to issue consolidated reports on piracy and armed robbery against ships to, among others, the IMO. In 2004, all but five of the 330 attacks listed in the IMO’s annual report were reported by the Piracy Reporting Centre of the IMB (4).

Compared with the general understanding of the word ”piracy”, however, the IMB’s definition is very broad. For statistical purposes, the Bureau defines piracy and armed robbery as an ”act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act” (5). This definition not only covers actual and attempted attacks in international as well as territorial waters; it also includes all types of attacks regardless of whether the ship is berthed, at anchor or at sea.

This definition is unfortunate – even if only for statistical purposes – because it blurs any attempt to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the problem of ”piracy” in Southeast Asia as well as in other parts of the world. Many of the so-called armed robberies in port areas are in fact more readily describable as ”theft in port”, typically involving some three to five perpetrators boarding a ship in order to steal supplies, such as engine spare parts, some cans paint and ropes. These so-called ”pirates” in port are not likely to be identical with the more audicious – and often more violent – pirates who board steaming vessels at sea, with both their methods and objectives differing. From the point of view of protection and law enforcement, moreover, it does not seem very helpful to conflate the two types of incidents as they require very different counter-measures. Combatting the first type of incidents mainly involves improving security onboard ships when in port and in port areas, whereas combatting the second type of incidents requires international coordination and intelligence sharing between the authorities of several nations, the shipping industry and international organizations.

Mapping Piracy

Seperating the IMO/IMB statistics from the 75 incidents that in 2004 were reported to have occurred in port areas in Southeast Asia – mainly in Indonesia – results in a somewhat different and much clearer picture. What is left are 92 cases of actual and attempted attacks at sea (in addition to two cases of spotted suspicious craft), heavily concentrated to three adjacent regions along the east coast of Sumatra: The northern parts of the Malacca Strait (34 cases), the southern parts of the Malacca Strait including Singapore Strait and Indonesia’s Riau-Lingga archipelago (23 cases), and the waters east of southern Sumatra (eleven cases). Together these areas accounted for close to 74 per cent of all reported attacks at sea in Southeast Asia. Other areas where several cases were reported were the southern parts of the South China Sea (six cases), the Makassar Strait east of Indonesian Borneo (six cases) and the Sulu region of the southern Philippines and eastern Sabah (four cases).

The figures stand out as high in international comparison, but they hardly justify descriptions of Southeast Asia or the Malacca Strait as ”piracy prone” or pirate-infested”. With around 200 ships transiting the Strait daily, the risk for an individual ship of being attacked was between 0,1 and 0,2 per cent in 2004 (6). In the southern Malacca Strait area, as well as in the waters off southern Sumatra, most of the attacks – around 80 per cent of actual attacks – were what may be called Low-Level Armed Robberies (LLAR), or ”petty piracy”, involving a group of pirates, generally armed with knives and non-automatic firearms, boarding the victim ship in the aft from a small open craft with the objective of stealing cash and portable valuables such as watches, jewellery and electronics. These pirates generally avoid violence unless resisted and leave the ship with their loot within 15 to 20 minutes.

Map of South East Asia

Traumatic as these attacks may be for the crews and passengers of the victim ships, they do not seem to constitute a big problem for the shipping industry. The IMB has estimated the average value of property lost in each such attack to around US $ 5,000 (7) – and this has probably declined over the past few years as the development of more efficient and safe ways to transfer money electronically worldwide has made it less necessary for ships to carry large sums of cash. In the southern parts of the Malacca Strait, the petty piracy attacks have been going on more or less incessantly for the past 25 years and have led to the development of a range of relatively easy and uncostly measures that can be implemented onboard ships in order to avert an attack. Aside from arming merchant vessels – which most shipping companies, trade unions and international organizations do not recommend for fear of escalating the violence thereby endangering the safety of the crew and vessel – these include alert anti-piracy watches, illuminating the deck at night (when most attacks take place), locking all doors and hatches of the ship’s superstructure and rigging fire hoses in the aft to prevent pirates from boarding. One of the most efficient preventive measures is Secure-Ship, an easily collapsable electric fence which is mounted around the ship and which uses a 9,000 volt, non-lethal, electric schock to deter intruders and sets off an alarm if tampered with (8).

Of greater concern to the international community and the crews of international vessels are the more violent attacks which mainly occur in the northern parts of the Malacca Strait. Of the 18 actual attacks that were reported there in 2004, 15 (83 per cent) may be called High-Level Armed Robberies (HLAR), involving heavily armed pirates not hesitating to use lethal violence. In addition to these 15 attacks, moreover, there were eight attempted attacks in which ships were fired at. Several of the robberies involved the shooting and killing or wounding of crew members, the taking of hostages and hijackings of whole vessels, especially tugs and barges. The most serious incident took place on 5 January 2004, when armed pirates boarded the Indonesian tanker Cherry 201 and took 13 crew members hostage. The pirates later released the captain so that he could convey their demand for ransom, but as the shipping company failed to pay the ransom – initially set for US $47,616 but eventually negotiated down to a quarter of that amount – the pirates one month later shot dead four crew members. The remaining eight jumped overboard and escaped (9).

The IMB suspects that the perpetrators of the kidnap-for-ransom attacks in the Northern Malacca Strait are members of the Free Aceh Movement, GAM, which since 1976 has waged a guerilla war for Acehnese independence from Indonesia. However, even though GAM members have been known to engage in kidnappings, particularly of Indonesian businessmen, on land, it seems unlikely that the organization on a central level would endorse piratical activity. The strategy of the GAM leaders, most of whom live in exile in Sweden, has been to try to gain the sympathy of the international community for Acehnese independence, and engaging in piracy would be clearly detrimental to this objective, especially against the background of much speculation about a possible connection between piracy and the threat of maritime terrorism in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. This said, however, it is possible that some local bands of GAM sympathisers may use piracy as a means of fund-raising – although it is equally possible that it is the work of politically non-committed bandits in the region.

The rebels of Free Aceh Movement are fighting for an independent 
Islamic state from Indonesia.

In the wake of the devastating tsunami which hit the region, particularly Aceh, on 26 December 2004, all piratical activity seemed to cease in the Malacca Straits, and there were no reported attacks during January 2005. As regards the northern parts of the Strait, this is quite understandable, as the pirates are likely to have been hard hit by the disaster with many of them probably killed and much of their equipment, including boats, engines and weapons, destroyed. The lull in piracy in the southern parts of the Strait is more difficult to explain, as the tsunami had no significant physical impact there, and as the pirates’ land bases, mainly located in Indonesia’s Riau archipelago, were left intact. The lull was in any case temporary, and from February 2005, attacks again began to be reported, both from the northern and southern parts of the Malacca Strait, with the same recognisable pattern of mainly High-Level Armed Robberies in the northern parts and mainly Low-Level Armed Robberies in the southern parts (10).

Combatting Piracy

Piracy in Southeast Asia is often explained by combination of poverty and weak law enforcement. The explanations generally – explicitly or implicitly – pinpoints Indonesia, the poorest country in the Malacca Strait region with the weakest marine law I enforcement capacity, as the source of the problem. To some extent the explanation is relevant. There is little doubt that most, if not all, pirates currently operating in the Malacca and Singapore Straits are Indonesians based in Indonesia – mainly, it seems, on the north coast of Aceh and possibly the east coast of the province of North Sumatra, and on the scattered small islands of Indonesia’s Riau archipelago just south of Singapore Strait. It is also obvious that the Indonsesian navy, which has the main responsibility for policing the country’s territorial waters, is overstretched and lacks the capacity to patrol the vast archipelago – not only against pirates, but also against smugglers of drugs, arms, contraband and humans and against large fleets of foreign fish trawlers operating illegally in Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. From that perspective it should perhaps come as no surprise if combatting piracy is not a main priority for the Indonesian navy and other authorities.

The attacks in the Malacca Strait region mainly (although not exclusively) befall non-Indonesian vessels, and most attacks – 82 per cent in 2004 – take place outside Indonesian territorial waters, mainly in international waters. With the Malacca Strait being one of the world’s most important international commercial shipping lanes, it might seem reasonable – at least from the point of view of the coastal states in the region – if the cost of policing the Strait were shared by all its users. However, when the Indonesian government, supported by Malaysia, in the early 1990s suggested that a toll system be introduced to pay for the cost of policing the Strait and protecting the environment, the suggestion won little support from the shipping industry or the international community. Saying that the shipowners seemed ”ungrateful” that they were allowed to use the Malacca Strait for free, Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Ghafar Baba bluntly summarized the Indonesian and Malaysian viewpoint: ”These people seem to have come out with a theory that they make the profit and we come out with the money to keep the straits clean of pollution and pirates” (11).

Since then the number of reported pirate attacks in Southeast Asia has multiplied, but the shipping industry and the international community in general have shown little willingness to share the cost of policing the Malacca Strait. The main exception has been Japan, which over the past years has taken the initiative to, and provided funding for, a number of efforts to suppress Southeast Asian piracy, including the provision of training programs and equipment to the law enforcement authorities in the region. The most recent of these initiatives is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), concluded among sixteen Asian countries (Bangladesh, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, India, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam) in Tokyo in November 2004. The most important provision of the agreement – which so far has only been signed by four states, Cambodia, Japan, Laos and Singapore – is the projected setting up of an Information Sharing Centre in Singapore in order to facilitate international cooperation in the suppression of piracy. The weakness of the agreement, however, is that it only obligates governments to share information which they deem pertinent to immediate pirate attacks and that Centre’s operation will depend on volontary contributions (12).

Even though ReCAAP may be a significant development, it will not be enough to eradicate piracy in Southeast Asia. Doing so will probably require more far-reaching arrangements for international cooperation, including joint or coordinated patrols and the right of so-called ”hot pursuit” into the territorial waters of a neighbouring country. At the moment, however, such arrangements seem unlikely to come about. Piracy remains a comparatively minor problem for most Southeast Asian countries, and strong sensitivities over issues of national sovereignty are a major obstacle to the forging of any binding agreements among the countries of the region.

Meanwhile, for all the talk of piracy as a menace to international maritime commerce, most shipowners do not seem terribly concerned. The risk of an attack is still very small, and the economic losses incurred are generally bearable – usually below the decuctible level of the insurance policy. Consequently, and in accordance with the laws of market economy, piracy is likely to persist as long as the cost of protection is higher than the incurred losses.

Stefan Eklöf (Stefan.Eklof@ace.lu.se), Ph.D., Research Fellow, Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies, Lund University, is the author of Pirates in Paradise: A Modern History of Southeast Asia’s Maritime Marauders, Copenhagen: NIAS Press. He wrote this article for Japan Focus. Posted on August 5, 2005.

Endnotes

(1) International Maritime Organization, ”Reports on Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships – Annual Report 2004”, MSC.4/Circ.64, 5 May 2005, accessed on 26 July 2005. The IMO report does not use the term ”Southeast Asia” but the more inexact ”Far East” (further divided into ”Malacca Strait” and ”South China Sea”). All but four of the 173 cases recorded in the ”Far East”, however, occurred in Southeast Asia (i.e. in or around the waters of ASEAN countries).

The IMO distinguishes between ”piracy” which, in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, is defined as incidents occurring on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any state, and ”armed robbery” which is defined as incidents occurring within a state’s jurisdiction.

(2) Lintner, Bertil, Blood Brothers: The Criminal Underworld of Asia, New York and Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2003.

(3) Resolution A.545(13) on ”Measures to Prevent Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships”, adopted by the IMO Assembly, 13th session, 17 November 1983. In 2004, only three states, Colombia, Liberia and the United Arab Emirates, reported attacks to the organization.

(4) The IMB also publishes annual (as well as bi-annual) piracy reports; see ICC International Maritime Bureau, ”Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. Annual Report, 1 January – 31 December 2004”, Barking, Essex: ICC International Maritime Bureau 2005. In addition, the IMB posts weekly piracy reports on the Internet (accessed on 26 July 2005).

(5) Ibid., p. 2; italics in original.

(6) It is assumed that the real number of attacks were twice the reported number, giving a total of 114 for the year in the northern and southern parts of the Malacca Strait.

(7) Gottshalk, Jack A. and Brian P. Flanagan, Jolly Roger with an Uzi: The Rise and Threat of Modern Piracy, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2000, p. 90.

(8) See further the manufacturer’s Internet web page at http://www.secure-marine.com, accessed on 28 July 2005.

(9) Gunawan, Apriadi, ”Pirates kill four aboard ship in North Aceh”, Jakarta Post, 6 February 2004, and ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2005, p. 17.

(10) See the IMO’s monthly reports for January–March 2005: MSC.4/Circ.65,MSC.4/Circ.66, and MSC.4/Circ.67, all accessed on 28 July 2005.

(11) Wong Sai Wan, ”M’sia willing to provide security in the Straits”, The Star, 7 September 1992.

(12) John F. Bradford, ”The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia”, Naval War College Review, 58: 3.

Indonesia's Petrosea base at Balikpapan has urgent need for HSE super

PT Petrosea Tbk has been designing, building and mining in all corners of Indonesia since 1972 and today is recognized as one of Indonesia’s leading engineering, construction and mining contractors. Thanks to the imagination and commitment of the employees, Petrosea has secured a growing portfolio of projects throughout Indonesia and the region.
Petrosea has access and support to world class management and project delivery systems which allows Petrosea to deliver international excellence to the Indonesian market.
We are currently taking applicants for the following position:
HSE SUPERINTENDENT FOR POSB
Education: Minimum Diploma Degree (D3) in Civil Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, EHS, or equivalent.
Requirements:
1. Minimum 5 years experience in related fields such as Supply Base, Oil & Gas, or Mining industry. 2. Maximum age is 40 years old. 3. Preferably having HSE Expert certificate. 4. Strong experience in permit to work system, SOP, JSA, Accident / Incident Investigation. 5. Familiar with ISO 9001, ISO 14001 system, and OHSAS 18001 is an advantage. 6. Preferably has been trained in fire fighting, first aid, rigging, etc. 7. Fluent in English, strong computer literacy, good personal skill and able to motivate people. 8. Able to monitor more than 300 employees. 9. Able to work under high pressure. 10. Excellent health, hard worker, energetic, and dynamic. 11. Willing to be based in Tanjung Batu, Balikpapan. Responsibilities:
1. Responsible for creating and maintaining overall safety environments and HSE focus at the POSB. Undertake all duties of HSE Officer in his absence or not assigned. 2. Assist in measuring compliance with Government HSE Regulations 3. Socialise and record all Job Safety Analyses, HAZID, HAZOB, and co-ordinate Emergency Response Team training and activities for the POSB. 4. Assist the POSB Superintendents in the conducting and reporting of all HAZID and HAZOB activities. 5. Perform routine scheduled Inspections and Audits of HSE Compliance according to Petrosea procedures and “One Clough” principles 6. Prepare, implement and maintain Health and Safety Management Plans, Environmental Management Plans and Emergency Response Procedures for the Project 7. Ensure decisions and practices are in line with the principles of the POSB Safety and Health Policy, HSE Management Plan, Environmental Management Plan and HSE Procedures. 8. Assist POSB Shift Supervisors with the development of job safety analyses (JSA) and ensure these are correctly prepared and implemented at all time.. 9. Ensure HSE Manuals and Employee HSE Handbooks are available and used as a reference by POSB Supervisors 10. Monitor rehabilitation programmes 11. Lead by example and have a proactive approach to all safety and environmental related issues. 12. Plan the required safety work permits and obtain approvals before work commences in conjunction with the Supervision. 13. Actively support the efforts of the HSE Committee 14. Maintain all MSDS data on site and issue to employees when needed.Advise users of chemicals on proper HSE measures to follow. To apply for this position, please send your application together with a detailed resume including recent color photograph, and quoting in email subject: HSE SUPERINTENDENT FOR POSB to lavinia.budiyanto@petrosea.com in Microsoft Word format or Pdf, not more than 350kb.
ONLY QUALIFIED CANDIDATES WILL BE INVITED FOR INTERVIEW

Indonesia's Ancora in process of acquiring five coal miners

Ancora unit may issue bonds

Ika Krismantari , The Jakarta Post , Jakarta | Tue, 03/17/2009 3:42 PM | Business

Explosives raw material producer PT Multi Nitrotama Kimia (MNK)may issue bonds to help fund the construction of a new plant.

MNK is a unit of publicly listed energy company PT Ancora Indonesia Resources.

The bond issue may worth up to US$37 million, Ancora president director Usman H. Darus said Monday, and aims to help finance the $60 million new plant designed to boost MNK's production capacity.

Usman added the construction of the new plant was part of Ancora's long-term expansion drive.

Ancora is also in the process of acquiring five coal miners.

Usman said the acquisition deals, which could involve investment of up to US$100 million and be completed by May, were aimed at helping the company boost its coal reserves to anticipate estimated higher demand in the future.

"Even now, there are new buyers from China and Mexico who are willing to buy coal from us at market prices," he said.

"But due to limited reserves, we do not dare strike deals with any of them."

He added the Chinese and Mexican buyers were the next potential buyers of the company's coal, adding to its list of existing customers who are mainly from Malaysia and Japan.

The Malaysian and Japanese buyers have signed five-year contracts with Ancora for the delivery of up to 13 million tons of coal annually. The contracts were signed at below market prices.

Usman said the potential buyers from China and Mexico had ordered up to 840,000 tons of coal per year.

To try to meet those demands, Ancora vice president Teddy K. Somantri said the company was vying for the five coal companies, with total reserves of 24 million tons in South Kalimantan and West Kalimantan.

"We are still waiting for due diligence reports from our geologists in the fields," he said.

Jakarta-based Ancora is a subsidiary of investment and buyout company Ancora Capital Management Limited, founded by JPMorgan alumnus Gita Wirjawan.

Ancora Capital, which has so far managed to raise $300 million in funding from Muslim investors in Brunei, Malaysia and the Middle East, is Indonesia's first sharia-compliant private equity fund.

Ancora Indonesia has recently taken over a 40 percent stake in MNK, which controls around 70 percent of the country's market share for explosive materials.

Ancora Indonesia is among the handful of local companies now seeking business opportunities in the country's lucrative coal sector.

Gita, co-chairman of Ancora Capital, said recently the company would keep focusing on the natural resources business because of its good prospects for the future, adding it had embarked on a series of measures to cement its expan-sion drive.

Last September, Ancora Capital, in cooperation with PT Mitra Rajasa, acquired a controlling ownership in oil-drilling and logistics firm PT Apexindo Pratama Duta, in a deal estimated to be worth $182 million.

The following month, it bought a 5 percent stake in giant coal producer PT Bumi Resources at around $75 million from JPMorgan, which was holding the shares as collateral against loans taken out by the Bakrie Group of Companies.

Far East Security Briefing

Far East Security Briefing

• Xinhua - China and Russia will launch a joint anti-terror drill in Northeast China this year, a defense official has said. “The defense ministries of the two countries are currently discussing details of the drill,” Qian Lihua, director of the Ministry of Defense’s foreign affairs office, said.
• China Daily - Taiwan’s military will trim its forces by about a fifth by 2014 and shift toward a more defensive posture, the province announced yesterday. The Quadrennial Defense Review, the first defense white paper under leader Ma Ying-jeou, who favors a peace agreement with the mainland, said Taiwan will reduce its troop numbers from the current count of about 275,000 to about 215,000 over the next five years, strengthening unit combat capability.
• Yonhap - North Korea’s premier started his five-day trip to China on Tuesday, where he will attend an opening ceremony marking the 60th anniversary of bilateral relations and likely meet with Chinese leaders. Kim Yong-il, premier of North Korea’s Cabinet, arrived in Beijing as his country prepares to launch what it claims is a communications satellite into orbit in early April.
• news.com.au - An Indonesian terrorist on death row for his role in the bombing of Australia’s embassy in Jakarta has published a new book preaching jihad. In his new 224-page book, What is Jihad?, Darmawan is unrepentant about the attack, saying it was justified because it targeted “non-believers”, the Jakarta Globe newspaper reported.
• Observing Japan - The bill that will go before the Diet explicitly permits the MSDF to defend non-Japanese ships at sea and clarifies measures that can be taken by the MSDF to combat piracy. As of now, the MSDF will be permitted to use force in cases of legitimate self-defense, permitting the destroyers to fire warning shots and shots at the hull of pirate ships encountered.
• Japan Defense Ministry - Upon the Prime Minister’s approval, today the Minister of Defense has issued an order for maritime security operations to the Commander of the Self-Defense Fleet, to respond to piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. The outline of the order is shown as attached.
• Manila Times - Security forces clashed Monday with Abu Sayyaf terrorists holding hostage three Red Cross workers in Sulu, police said. The fighting erupted in the hinterlands of Indanan town where soldiers and police forces have encircled an area where the terrorists are holding Swiss Andreas Notter, Italian Eugenio Vagni and Filipina Mary Jean Lacaba. Police said unconfirmed reports have one of the terrorist leaders Albader Parad was either wounded or killed in the fighting.
• Straits Times - Two people were killed and at least four others wounded in a grenade attack blamed on Islamic militants in the southern Philippines, police and military said on Tuesday. Men believed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf group tossed the grenade into a karaoke bar on Jolo island late on Monday, police said.
• RSIS - The ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement signed recently in Thailand marks a milestone for ensuring regional energy security by including a provision for voluntary oil stockpiles. However, mandatory, as opposed to voluntary, oil stockpiling could better serve the medium- and long-term energy security needs of ASEAN.
• Irrawaddy - Brunei and Malaysia sealed a pact Monday to settle a maritime territorial dispute that has blocked the exploration of rich offshore oil reserves off Borneo island for six years.
• Jakarta Post - President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono discussed on Monday contentious issues on Rohingya boat people and democracy in junta-ruled Myanmar with visiting Myanmarese Prime Minister Gen. Thein Sein.

Anti-piracy operations

We have already seen how the Red Cross and United States Coast Guard has successfully implemented Twitter in their effort to dissimenate information and update participants during times of emergency. Has the US Navy joined the social media revolution to help combat piracy in Somali waters? Well in it’s own way (of course). Bloomberg Tells us:

In the command room of the Psara, German, Dutch, French, Spanish, Portuguese and Greek officers watched a computer screen updating the positions of 17 warships. Another computer showed the location of 300 merchant ships, potential prey spread over 3,000 miles (4,800 kilometers).

The tracking is done with a mix of Global Positioning System navigation and Centrix, a military-communication system developed by NATO, as well as a Web site specially developed for the mission on which commercial ships enter their positions.

Since late January, Papaioannou also has had a new tool: a third computer in the command room carries an Internet chat channel. On a recent visit, sailors from the Psara, two U.S. warships and the Spanish frigate SPS Victoria were exchanging instant messages in English about their positions and about unconfirmed reports of a fire on board a boat in Somalia’s Mogadishu harbor.

In a corner of the room, which bristled with radar and radio equipment, hung a Jolly Roger flag. Black-and-white photos of suspected pirate ships were tacked to the wall.

The EU formed the Atalanta mission after Somali pirates in September seized a Ukrainian ship carrying tanks and, in November, a Saudi tanker carrying fuel. Task Force 151 will grow to six this month with the arrival of frigates from Singapore and Turkey.

The coordination paid off on March 3, when the freighter MV Courier, operated by German shipping company Gebrueder Winter, sent a distress signal at 10:12 a.m. local time as it came under grenade fire from a skiff. Read More…

While the implementation of Automated Identification System (AIS) has been revolutionary in its ability to track and communicate with ships, AIS gives us only a small peak into the capabilities Information Technology has to change the way we operate ships. By integrating real time chat, the multinational forces in the area suddenly are able to coordinate their efforts, a powerful tool previously not available to them. Here’s an example of the problems they faced:

“When I arrived here in December we exchanged a daily intention message with the Americans, but that was about it,” said Papaioannou, 51. “Then one day we had two helicopters patrolling the same area, which is a waste. I sent three of my officers to the U.S. command ship and we worked it out.”

Now the revolution behind twitter is it’s ability to combine the real time, short message, capabilities of chat with communities of members that share common interests. Twitter is also set up like a blog recording historical data that is search able by both Google and its own internal engine. We do not know specific of the Navy’s system but, if twitter were used in the Gulf Of Aden, daily information reports, problems and intelligence could be pushed out to vessels and military assets in real time. By recording the information and allowing it to be searched (by authorized users!) you bring new functionality to the war on pirates including:

1) Trend Analysis - Mapping problem areas, times of day, ship characteristics, etc… trends will emerge that will enable the forces to become better prepared

2) Historic Data - Each time a ship returns to the area you have historic data on their last transit. Valubale information in predicting strenghts and weaknesses.

3) Evidence - The primary reason hijackings occur in Somalia is lack of accountability. The pirates know the chances of getting caught and serving jail time are low. Plans are underway to convict pirates in a court of law and for that to happen evidence is required. A twitter like program would allow ships, navy assets and private security firms to photograph, upload and archive photos and other evidence of the pirates. Tying this system into aerial feeds from UAV’s, ground intelligence and emerging systems would give you a robust data platform.

With both Twitter and the Navy’s pirate chat software getting high marks from users the question remains… how can these systems be integrated into maritime safety initiatives? One idea is to have a twitter like system for each port which gives pilots, VTS, ship agents and vessels access to live data and the opportunity to discuss issues of concerns in real time. Would the Cosco Busan have gotten underway if the pilots were all chatting with VTS and NOAA about the fog conditions or would a mutual consensus have changed the mind of her captain and Pilot?

What are your thoughts? Is a maritime version of twitter realistic or is there a better platform for opening dialogue between individual ship captain and port athourities? What are road blocks for wide scale implementation?

-John ( twitter.com/gCaptain )

About The Author

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Captain John Konrad is co-founder of Unofficial Networks and Editor In Chief of this blog. He is a USCG licensed Master Mariner of Unlimited Tonnage and, since graduating from SUNY Maritime College, has sailed a variety of ships from ports around the world. John currently lives in Morro Bay, California with his wife and two children. John can be reached at john@gCaptain.com
Full Profile: John

Vietnamese cargo rescued from pirates

ANKARA (AFP) — Turkish and Danish warships intercepted an attack by pirates on a Vietnamese cargo ship in the Gulf of Aden, the Turkish army chief of staff said Monday.

Two Turkish helicopters helped repel Sunday's attack on the M/V Diamond Falcon off Yemen's southern coast after the Vietnamese boat issued a distress signal, an army statement said.

The Danish navy told AFP that the pirates, who attacked on two speedboats, fled, and that no arrests were made.

It added that the attack took place in a busy fishing zone, making it easier for the pirate craft to disguise their intent.

The statement did not give their nationality, but more than 100 attacks last year in one of the world's busiest shipping lanes have mostly been blamed on Somali pirates.

The United States, European Union countries, China and Russia have already deployed naval vessels to the region.

East Kalimantan's Sebuku Island Coal Mine

Location

Straits Resources subsidiary Straits Asia Resources which is listed in Singapore, owns and operates the Sebuku Coal Mine in Indonesia. The Sebuku coal mine is an opencut truck and shovel coal mining operation located on Sebuku Island, in the province of South Kalimantan, Indonesia. The mining concession is held under a second generation Coal Cooperation Agreement signed by PTBCS with the state Directorate of Mines & Energy.

Sebuku Island is located 3’30" south of the equator to the south-east of the island of Borneo, approximately 5km east of Laut Island. The island is 35km from north to south and is 10km wide at its widest point. The island has generally subdued topography with a maximum elevation of up to 125m along the series of hills that form the elevated eastern part of the island. To the west of the line of hills, the topography is gently undulating with elevations typically ranging from 5m to 25m. The western coastal zone is a series of grassy freshwater swamps bordered by a well-developed coastal mangrove zone up to 500m in width.

Sebuku Island is a remote location. Prior to the commencement of operations the population was 4,000 persons and virtually no infrastructure existed with the exception of local foot-trails. The population has expanded to about 4,500 and PTBCS has constructed local access roads and a new portsite on the southern end of the island. The PTBCS operations employ a total of approximately 700 people (PTBCS and contractors), of which 320 (some 46%) are local inhabitants, and are located in the south-west of the island. Following the construction of an airfield, access to the island is by fixed wing aircraft from Balikpapan or via a daily speedboat connection from nearby Kota Baru.

Regional location Map

Sebuku Mine Site Location Map

Preliminary exploration was undertaken in 1991 with detailed exploration being completed in 1994-1995. A detailed feasibility study was completed in 1996 by Coleman and Associates Pty Ltd which led to the approval of mining by the Directorate of Mines. A construction, mining and processing contract was awarded to John Holland in February 1997 following a competitive tendering process. Mining was contracted to Leighton Contracting Indonesia (LCI) who aquired John Holland Construction Indonesia in May 2000. In August 2003, the LCI mining contract was terminated and a new contract awarded to an Indonesian mining company Bukit Makmur Mandiri Utama (BUMA). LCI continues to run the processing facility.